




FDP’s election defeat in 2013  
– reasons and consequences*
After the reunification of Germany and inclusion of the former German De-
mocratic Republic states into the Republic of Germany some social changes 
occurred which influenced the way people received German political parties. 
The party system became fragmented and characterised by similarities in pro-
gram. Because of swift changes in the quality of life and employment circu-
mstances the traditional identification of political parties with their groups 
of interests ceased to be trustworthy, the social democrats lost their support 
among workers and it was no longer believed that the Free Democratic Party 
will be supported by the middle class. The result of a spreading general criti-
cism of political parties was the term Parteienverdrossenheit which expressed 
a lack of trust and disapproval of the works of political parties by the Germans1.
In the Parliament election on 22 September 2013 the CDU/CSU coalition 
received 41.6% of votes; SPD – 25.7%; FDP – 4.8%; the Coalition 90/Green 
– 8.6%; the Left (die Linke) – 8.6; and the Alternative for Germany (Alternati-
ve für Deutschland) – 4.7%. How did it come to this that the Free Democratic 
* Tłumaczenie na język angielski Tomasz Stephan.
1  F. Decker, Parteien und Parteiensysteme in Deutschland, Stuttgart 2011, s. 17; M. Za-
wilska-Florczuk, Zmiany na niemieckiej scenie partyjnej po 2009 roku, [w:] A. Kruk, 
M. Sus, Niemiecka scena polityczna 2009–2013. Aktorzy, zagadnienia i  wyzwania, 
Wrocław 2013, s. 23–30; A. Kruk, Przeobrażenia niemieckiej sceny partyjnej – sposoby 
przełamywania impasu na przykładzie Wolnej Partii Demokratycznej, [w:] A. Pacze-
śniak, M. Wincławska, Partie polityczne w Polsce i w Europie. Struktury, funkcje, stra-
tegie w zmieniającym się otoczeniu, Wrocław–Toruń 2013, s. 69–71; K. Malinowski, 
System partyjny i zachowania wyborcze w zjednoczonych Niemczech, [w:] L. Janicki, 
B. Koszel, W. Wilczyński, Zjednoczenie Niemiec. Studia politologiczno-ekonomiczno
-prawne, Poznań 1996, s. 149.
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Party did not reach the 5% threshold to get into the Parliament and was thus 
reduced to the opposition outside the Bundestag? Can this election defeat 
from 2013 be explained exclusively by the term Parteienverdrossenheit and 
the crash of the “hyper stability” based on the system of two parties: one 
dominant and one weak, where FDP has always been present in the Ger-
man party system2? Karl-Rudolf Korte – a  renowned scientist researching 
German parties explained: “people moved away from FDP because it was 
no longer trustworthy. When the program and people start matching again, 
people will vote for the liberals again”3. Marta Zawilska-Florczuk identified 
the FDP crisis in their unkept election promises (especially those concerning 
lowering tax thresholds), which were not due to unwillingness to act, but to 
the general economic situation in the days of the Eurozone crisis4.
Jürgen Dittberner5, a retired professor of the University of Potsdam on the 
other hand, published a book in 2014 where he pronounced the end of the 
“German party state era” in 20136. The concept of a party state (Parteienstaat) 
has a long tradition reaching the Weimar Republic and has been defined as 
a state where political parties are so tightly connected with the country itself, 
that in situations of utmost importance for the state, it’s behaviour and will 
is always one with the behaviour and will of the party7. Dittberner’s forecast 
about the end of the German party state was a  reflection of the problems 
faced by all German political parties which were deeply connected to the 
history of the German parliament, such as the general social parties and FDP. 
Dittberner did not determine in his book however, if the defeat of 2013 sho-
uld be treated as the end or a chance to return to the Bundestag by the FDP, 
2  P. Kubiak, System partyjny i  partie polityczne zjednoczonych Niemiec (1990–2013), 
Poznań 2014, s. 68, 282.
3  K.R. Korte, „Eine Nische für die FDP ist da”, http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/liberale-ei-
ne-nische-fuer-die-fdp-ist-da.694.de.html?dram:article_id=307948 (dostęp: 30.10.2015).
4  M. Zawilska-Florczuk, dz. cyt., s. 33.
5  J. Dittberner belongs to a group of scientists researching the Free Democratic Party 
in the Republic of Germany. He published many books and articles on FDP. Com-
pare: J. Dittberner , Die F. D. P. an der Schwelle zum neuen Jahrhundert, „Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte” 2000, nr B5; J. Dittberner, Die FDP. Geschichte, Personen, Orga-
nisation, Perspektiven. Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden 2005; J. Dittberner, Die FDP: Von 
der Regierung in die außenparlamentarische Opposition und zurück?, Berlin 2014; 
J. Dittberner, Die FDP zwischen Neo- und Ordoliberalismus, „Vorgänge” 2010, nr 1; 
J. Dittberner, Sozialer Liberalismus. Ein Plädoyer, Berlin 2008.
6  J. Dittberner, Die FDP. Von der Regierung...
7  T. Nowak, Partie polityczne w Niemczech: ogólna charakterystyka, [w:] K.A. Wojtasz-
czyk (red.), Partie polityczne w Niemczech, Warszawa 2004, s. 18.
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but he was nearer to the opinion, that FDP will fail again. In four chapters 
the professor summed up problems and actions of the liberals up-to-date. 
According to Dittberner, the lack of popularity for the liberal views among 
Germans, decreasing numbers of traditional and stable FDP supporters, the 
absence of social clients, leadership issues and a critical stance of German 
media towards the FDP as well as being excluded from the Bundestag in the 
years 2013–2017 work against it8. Piotr Madajczyk shares his view concer-
ning a critical approach of the German media towards FDP when he presen-
ted critical articles about the FDP’s leaders in the “Spiegel” magazine9.
Until recently the meaning of this party in the German party system re-
sulted from the fact it was tipping the balance in favour of either CDU/CSU 
or SPD, from their distinct political program with the support of the free 
market as a high priority, and also from that – often criticised – image of 
a  party quickly switching its political alliances. From 1949 until 2013 the 
FDP has always had its representatives in the Bundestag and has always been 
a  member of the government apart from the two specific instances, whe-
re the so-called great coalition (CDU/CSU with SPD)ruled: 1966 until 1969 
and 2005 until 2009. The liberals co-governed with the Christian Democrats 
in the years 1949 until 1966 and 1982 until 1998; and from 1969 until 1982 
they formed a government coalition with SPD. In its role as the weak but 
essential partner to create a government coalition, they took up the role of 
the correcting party (Korrektivpartei). When cooperating with the SPD they 
made sure that the governing coalition program did not go too far towards 
a social character. But that determination in the struggle for power has often 
been criticised and the FDP was often called the swinger party (Umfallerpar-
tei). The political decision of the party’s leadership to switch their coalition 
partner in 1982 in order to remain in the government, was criticised not only 
by supporters of the SPD but also by liberals. As a  result some politicians 
left the FDP: for example Günther Verheugen, who changed parties after the 
liberals exited the coalition with the social democrats in order to cooperate 
with Christian Democrats. Despite all this there has not been a more effec-
tive duo in the 1980’s Germany as were Helmut Kohl and H.-D. Genscher. It 
was their cooperation that resulted in an extraordinary achievement in the 
international politics which was the reunification of Germany10.
8  J. Dittberner, Die FDP. Von der Regierung…, s. 134–135.
9  P. Madajczyk, Kryzys FDP czy kryzys liberalizmu w Niemczech?, „Myśl Ekonomiczna 
i Polityczna” 2012, nr 1, s. 101.
10  F. Walter, Gelb oder Grün? Kleine Paarteiengeschichte der besserverdienenden Mitte in 
Deutschland, Bielefeld 2010, s. 35. „Profil hinter dickem Milchglas”, 18.01.1980, http://
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The FDP comes from the tradition of German liberalism which bloomed 
in the 19th century when the ideas of renaissance and it’s values were supported 
by the elites. The supporters of liberalism were educated people often coming 
from the rich bourgeoisie and the liberals were perceived in the society as the 
party of “the better earning” (rich middle class)11. Representatives of this politi-
cal approach which was competing with the conservatives and socialists were: 
Friedrich Naumann and Gustav Stresemann who influenced the German po-
litical parties after World War I. After World War I Naumann led the left-libe-
ral fraction and Stresemann – the national-liberal12. In 1933 the liberal parties 
were banned in Germany and the FDP was founded as late as 1949 in western 
Germany. At that time Theodor Heuss enjoyed social prestige among German 
political leaders, next to Konrad Adenauer. He participated in creating the con-
stitution and was the first President of Western Germany. Despite the fact that 
in the German political system the role of the president is more representative 
and it is the head of the government (the chancellor) who sets the goals of the 
internal and foreign policy, the fact that T. Heuss took the post of the President 
had a positive influence on the image of the liberals. They became the third 
force after the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats among German 
parties. The FDP got into the Bundestag and in the beginning it was the party 
that tipped the balance, which allowed it to join the general democratic parties 
– CDU/CSU or SPD – and to create the federal government in coalition with 
either one of them. Despite the fact that the liberals were not strong enough to 
run for the post of the chancellor, politicians from this party: Theodor Heuss, 
Thomas Dehler, Erich Mende or Walter Scheel, enjoyed a broad support and 
worked towards the party’s good results in elections. The party’s trump in the 
post-war era were most definitely it’s charismatic leaders, receiving positive 
notes for their views and political style13.
www.zeit.de/1980/04/profil-hinter-dickem-milchglas (dostęp: 30.10.2015); H.  Ru-
dolph, Umfallerpartei FDP? Eine Partei eigener Art. Warum die Liberalen so sind, 
wie sie sind, 24.09.1982, http://www.zeit.de/1982/39/eine-partei-eigener-art (do-
stęp: 30.10.2015); K. Kamińska, Partie piwotalne w Niemieckiej Republice Federalnej, 
„Gdańskie Studia Międzynarodowe” 2010, nr 1/2, s. 184.
11  F. Walter, Gelb oder Grün? Kleine Parteiengeschichte der besserverdienenden Mitte in 
Deutschland, Bielefeld 2010.
12  P. Kubiak, Liberalizm niemiecki w czasach Republiki Weimarskiej: ugrupowania libe-
ralne w systemie politycznym Niemiec 1918–1933 (typescript of the Ph.D. thesis), Po-
znań 2006; W. Zieliński, Wolna Partia Demokratyczna – FDP, [w:] K.A. Wojtaszczyk 
(red.), dz. cyt., s.114
13  H. Vorländer, Der Dilemma der FDP, „Neue Gesellschaft. Frankfurter Hefte” 2011, nr 6, 
s. 31; P. Madajczyk, dz. cyt., s. 94–95.
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A coalition between the FDP and SPD was possible in 1969 due to sha-
red visions of the international policy. Both parties wanted to have better 
relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The FDP 
supported modernisation and implementing law and order in the 1960’s and 
70’s and this was its advantage. Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s leadership of the 
Foreign Office from 1974–1992 was given historic significance. His work 
style in the international policy with the main goal being the reunification 
of Germany in an integrated Europe was given term “genscherism” and pro-
voked comparisons with gaullism and thatcherism. The leadership character 
him to remain not only at the helm of the German diplomacy, but also that 
of the FDP. Genscher was viewed as an effective tactician who does not want 
to give up power rather than an ideologist of the party. Karl-Hermann Flach, 
Werner Maihofer, Ralf Dahrendorf and later Otto Graf Lambsdorff played 
greater part in creating the program of the party14. 
In the 1980s the Green party entered the Bundestag and gradually di-
minished the liberals’ position. A  new, distinguishable group showed up 
as competition and its leader Joschka Fischer gained society’s support. The 
number of political parties in the stabile German party system began to rise. 
Program differences between the liberals and the Green party were not di-
stinguishable, which allowed the Green party to take over the votes of the 
liberal voters. It is noteworthy that it was H-D. Genscher who strove for ta-
king action towards environmental protection in Europe: among others the 
cooperation of countries from the Donau basin. Another high priority of 
the FDP, the support of a free market was convergent with the program line 
of the German Christian Democrats. Thus the FDP was being accused of 
a “lack of political profile”, as described by another researcher of the German 
liberalism – Hans Vorländer. He came up with an interesting concept descri-
bing FDP’s situation after the reunification of Germany distinguishing three 
phases in creating the FDP’s image in the 90’s. He called the last decade of the 
20th century in the history of FDP a time from “euphoria to the cave of de-
spair” and talked about the following: a) “the fight of the Diadochi in the Ba-
bylonian prison” (1990–1994); b) an ineffective image nurturing 1994–1998 
and c) the election success in 199815.
14  A. Kruk, Rola i miejsce Hansa-Dietricha Genschera w polityce wewnętrznej i zagra-
nicznej Republiki Federalnej Niemiec w latach 1969–1992, Katowice 2010.
15  H. Vorländer, Die FDP im vereinten Deutschland, [w:] W. Woyke (red.), Parteien und 
Parteiensystem in Deutschland, Schwalbach 2002, s. 48; H. Vorländer, Die FDP nach 
der deutschen Vereinigung, „Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte”, 1992, nr 5; H. Vorlän-
der, Das strategische Dilemma der FDP, [w:] M. Machning, J. Rarschke (red.), Wohin 
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Undoubtedly, the reunification of Germany was a success for the FDP. The 
party gained as much as 11% of votes in the election on 2 December 1990 and 
received 79 seats for their representatives in the parliament16. Another suc-
cess was an increase in the number of party members17. The liberals profited 
from the popularity of Genscher and a renowned German political scientist 
Arnulf Baring, in his work titled Will the Germans make it? A  farewell to 
illusions saw the liberals as the only party that could fulfill the tasks which 
resulted from the internal process of reunification of both German states. An 
advantage of the FDP, according to Baring, was their support of individu-
alism and economic minimalism18.
The most obvious area of activity of the liberals was the international 
politics but after the resignation of Genscher from the posts of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Vice Chancellor his successors could not gain political 
prestige matching that of their mentor. Klaus Kinkel, the successor of Gen-
scher in the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, lacked the charisma and that 
in turn made it impossible for the liberals to be a strong coalition partner in 
Kohl’s cabinet. He was perceived as a conscientious fulfiller of tasks given by 
his principal but, on the other hand, he was criticised for lack of leadership 
qualities and lack of “colour”. What’s more, Kinkel took over from Genscher 
in a very unfavourable situation because his mentor left the politics in an at-
mosphere of criticism for starting a bloody Balkan conflict and lack of vision 
after achieving his political career’s no. 1 priority goal which was the reuni-
fication of Germany.
Another issue was the discouragement of the society to carry the we-
ight of the reunification of Germany. The voters did not want to support 
the Christian democrats and liberals who were talking about sacrifices. Sta-
tements of Otto Graf Lambsdorff, the Minister of Economy appointed by 
FDP, that Germans should carry the burden of transformation were greeted 
with objections. The motto of support for the liberal market, articulated in 
the “Lambsdorff Document”, a motto which is so important for the FDP’s 
steuert Deutschland? Bundestagswahl 2009. Ein Blick hinter Kulissen, Hamburg 2009; 
H. Vorländer, Die Schattenpartei. Mit Erfolg aus dem Scheinwerferlichkeit verschwun-
den: Die FDP, [w:] H. Zehetmeier, Das deutsche Parteiensystem. Perspektiven für das 
21. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden 2004
16  Tamże; P. Kubiak, dz. cyt., s. 279.
17  In 1982 the number of FDP members was 73 952, in 1990 – 178 625; in 2000 – 62 721 
and in 2012 – 60 181. Freie Demokratische Partei, [w:] F. Decker, V. Neu (red.), Han-
dbuch der deutschen Parteien 2013, Bonn 2013, s. 270.
18  A. Baring, Czy Niemcom się uda? Pożegnanie złudzeń, Wrocław 2000, s. 255–260.
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program, did not find applause. The voters became tired of the Christian 
Democrats and liberals coalition and, after a wave of enthusiasm caused by 
the reunification of Germany, began to criticise the government for the cost 
of the transformation. Apart from that, Germany’s reunification increased 
the meaning of the left-wing PDS party among German political parties. In 
1993 the FDP lost its meaning in the local parliaments and the election “su-
per year” in 199419 brought its defeat in the European Parliament elections20.
These changes were caused not only by the transformations in the internal 
politics but also on the international stage, where the ongoing globalisation 
brought the changes in the structure of the German family and the German 
labour market. The traditional image of the German political parties evolved 
– as demonstrated by the attempts of finding a modern economy solutions 
by the German social democrats in the so called “third way in economy”. 
The FDP began to fight for the support of voters by attempting to change the 
image of a party of one topic which was lowering taxes and began to create 
a profile of a party for the whole nation.
As a result of the election in 1998 the FDP lost the capability to be a part of 
the federal government for 11 years21. According to Thore Barfuss it was the 
beginning of failures and diminishing the party’s prestige which could not be 
overcome after 2009 when the FDP got an amazing result in elections (14.6% 
of votes) and entered the government of Angela Merkel receiving the posts of 
Vice Chancellor and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Guido Westerwelle, 
Ministry of Health for Philip Rösler, the Justice Ministry for Sabine Leuthe-
usser-Schnarrenberger, the Ministry of Economy and Technology for Rainer 
Brüderle and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development for 
Dirk Niebel22. The Free Democratic Party which was a  part of opposition 
from 1998 until 2009 tried to gain the support of voters by presenting itself 
as a group supporting the idea of a civic society, liberal free market economy 
19  The aim of this term is to stress, that in 1994 the Germans went to the voting bo-
oths many times, because there were 19 different types of elections in whole Ger-
many. A  similar situation occured in 2009. More: A. Kruk, Wybory w  Niemczech 
w 2009 roku. Program i profil polityczny II rządu Angeli Merkel. Zarys informacyjny, 
[in:] L. Meissner, M. Wilk, Polska i Niemcy w Europie. Przyczynki z dziedziny kultury, 
polityki i historii współczesnej, Łódź 2011, s. 218.
20  A. Kruk, Wolna Partia Demokratyczna (FDP) w Parlamencie Europejskim, „Rocznik 
Integracji Europejskiej” 2009, nr 3, s. 356.
21  H. Vorländer, Die Schattenpartei…, s. 164.




and the deepening and broadening of the European integration. In 1997 the 
party declared in Wiesbaden thesis for the liberal civic society which were 
another important program concept next to the Freiburg Thesis and Keulen 
Thesis from 1977. In supporting creativity, competitiveness and criticism 
they saw a chance for the society to open for innovative ideas. This was an 
evolution of the old German party system’s architecture. Support for the civic 
society was a reaction to the increasing discouragement towards the political 
parties observed among Germans.
The election in 2002 was a  breakthrough in the German party system 
because neither of the general social parties reached 40% of support which 
had always been the case before23. The liberals decided to use the experience 
gathered in their traditional backwoods such as North-Rhine Westfalia whe-
re, thanks to an effective campaign, they gained support. Guido Westerwelle 
fought for support by criticising the general social parties. The position of 
the liberals was also impaired – they faced accusations of populism, their 
election programme from 2002, which was based on presenting itself as an 
“entertainment party”, instilled doubt. The FDP’s leader Guido Westerwel-
le did not shy from using populist means in his election campaign seeking 
more support, and he even participated in the reality TV show Big Brother. 
This was detrimental to his image of a politician active both in his work on 
the party program and in his efforts to strengthen his leadership within the 
party. Westerwelle presented his views in books, where he called for changes 
on the German political stage. Before the election of 1998 he published Neu-
land. Einstieg in einen Politikwechsel and in 2002 18. Mein Buch zur Wahl24. 
On 27 October 2009 the FDP had a great success by gaining 14.6% support. 
Their result in western Germany was much higher than that in eastern part of 
the country (15.5% to 10.6%)25. Thanks to that result the FDP had the oppor-
tunity to form the government cabinet under leadership of Angela Merkel. 
When Guido Westerwelle received the post of the Minister of Foreign Affa-
irs, however, he began losing support of the general public as a result of his 
statements and actions. His leadership style – authoritarian and focused on 
building a party which was a “one man show” – was good enough to gain 
power but not to maintain the support of the German voters. His criticism of 
23  K. Bachmann, P. Buras, S. Płóciennik, Republika bez gorsetu. Niemcy po wyborach 2005, 
Wrocław 2005.
24  G. Westerwelle, Neuland. Einstieg in einen Politikwechsel, München–Düsseldorf 1998; 
G. Westerwelle (red.), 18. Mein Buch zur Wahl, München 2002.
25  Freie Demokratische Partei, [w:] F. Decker, V. Neu (red.), dz. cyt., s. 274.
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consumption at a time of deep economic crisis in the European Union was 
unacceptable for many Germans. His support for the idea of European inte-
gration was associated with old ideas and solutions rather than with a new 
and creative plan for foreign policy. Old and proven allies were alienated by 
the German diplomacy position towards the conflict in the Middle East and 
Northern Africa. Withholding from the vote in the Security Council on air-
strikes in Libya was a test for the French-German alliance, which was formed 
in the Elysee Treaty from 1963. Taking Brazil or Russia side cast doubt on the 
priorities of the German diplomacy and instilled fear that traditional allian-
ces will be replaced by new ones.
The voters got the impression that the FDP got out of the habit of gover-
ning and lost the ability to work in coalition and Westerwelle was criticised 
more and more and blamed over the defeat of the liberals in state parlia-
ment elections in Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Palatinate in 2011. As 
a  consequence, Westerwelle was deprived of FDP’s leadership. During the 
convent in Rostock in May 2011 Philipp Rösler received 95.1% of the votes 
and took the chairman position. Westerwelle kept the post of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, but was deprived of the Vice Chancellor position. Three pe-
ople: Philipp Rösler, Christian Lindner and Daniel Bahr began to gradually 
take over the power in the party. They were responsible for the preparation of 
the new program. It was consulted between 2010 and 2012 and announced in 
Karlsruhe in a document called Thesis about freedom towards an open society. 
The new program was founded on the ideas of the classic liberalism such as 
those of Wilhelm Röpke, Friedrich August von Hayek, John Locke and John 
Stuart Mill. The influence of the economic crisis in Europe was also present 
in the program. Rösler argued that the image of moderate party should be 
adopted and that FDP should become a  party of a  “compassionate libera-
lism”26. The discussion on the program reform reflected differences among 
the FDPs members, new fractions were formed such as the Dahrendorf circ-
le (Nadja Hirsch, Gesine Meißner, Alexander Alvaro, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis 
and Christoph Giesa), Meeting Rounds at Maxwell’s (Sabine Leutheusser
-Schnarrenberger, Christian Lindner, Daniel Bahr, Max Stadler, Michael Ka-
uch and Miriam Gruß) or The Liberal Breakthrough. 
Rösler and the FDP leader in the Bundestag, Reiner Brüderle, dominated 
the 2013 election campaign. They represented two generations of the German 
FDP. The biggest advantage of Brüderle, born in 1945, was his experience, 




Rösler on the other hand was supposed to symbolise the willingness to chan-
ge both in the party and in the country. Despite the engagement of the young 
FDP leaders in the election campaign in 2013, the party suffered defeat. The 
party’s reform attempts came to late and the political rivals turned out to be 
too strong. The Green party took over the FDP voters but also the emergence 
of new groups in the German politics, such as the Pirate Party or Alternative 
for Germany, added to the defeat. The liberals won 4.8% of the votes in the 
whole country. They received merely 2.7% of votes in Eastern Germany and 
5.2% in Western Germany, which shows how strong the voters in the East 
opposed their economic program27.
Being outside the Bundestag is a huge loss and danger for the FDP and its 
representatives. They lost the stage where they could express their views. At 
the same time the whole party’s infrastructure is at risk: should they further 
lose support in the next election and not go over the 5% threshold, the party 
will lose government subsidies. The Friedrich Naumann foundation will lose 
its funding source if FDP will remain outside of the parliament after the next 
election.
That’s why as early as on 8 December 2013 during the convention sum-
ming up the election results, the FDP announced that it will fight for the 
voters’ support in the next Parliament election. There were changes in the 
party’s leadership during that convent. stepped down as chairman and Chri-
stian Lindner was elected for this position. In his inaugural speech he called 
for courage and presented a special mission for the liberals, which is to pro-
tect the liberal values in the Republic of Germany. He also praised the libe-
rals for their cooperation with the SPD towards economic relationships with 
the East. He argued that historical coalition partner change, which removed 
Helmut Schmidt from power and gave it to Helmut Kohl, was beneficial for 
Germany. He emphasised that it was the liberals who took on the burden of 
fighting populistic ideas of “policy of pleasing” in the 1990s and warned Ger-
mans not to take improvident steps. Lindner explained that when in 2009 the 
liberals came back to power, they were in an extremely uncomfortable situ-
ation. They had to act in an atmosphere of economic crisis in Europe and the 
society opposed their realistic forecasts and calls for policy of efficiency. Ac-
cording to Lindner, the FDP is now the only political group on the German 
political stage that offers an optimistic and friendly political concept, where 
the human being is at the centre of the liberal ideas not the state, or any other 
27  P. Kubiak, System…, s. 282.
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abstract ideas, or social classes. The new chairman of the party expressed 
his support to fight for policies that support individualism, tolerance and 
fair play rules in the society. He stated that the liberals should continue their 
support of the free market economy, fight against increasing the public debt 
by social transfers, and strive for the improvement in teaching standards and 
activities towards environmental protection28.
Despite the personal changes and the new program concept, the situation 
of the FDP did not improve rapidly. The changes in the party did not transla-
te into a positive result in the European Parliament election. The liberals lost 
over 7.6 percentage points of the support they had in 2009, which was 11%. 
The abolition on the 5% threshold in the European Parliament elections was 
to their advantage. This way they were not thrown out of the EP with their 
3.4% result and Alexander Graf Lambsdorff is the FDPs representative in the 
liberal fraction29.
The media, however, saw hope for the FDP not in Lindner or Lambsdorff, 
but in Katja Suding, an FDP activist from Hamburg. The young, educated 
and attractive FDP leader drew the media’s attention with her innovative 
ideas which she used in the election campaign for the state parliament in 
Hamburg in 2015. The posters and TV spots of FDP were dominated by the 
magenta colour. The media had the impression that Suding had better Public 
Relations knowledge than Silvana Koch-Mehrin, the former European Par-
liament member of the FDP. Using her charisma, the politician from Ham-
burg won the voters’ support for a program based on social market economy 
and stressed the meaning of equal chances in education. Her work bore fruit 
and the liberals began to regain support on 15 February 2015. They received 
7.4% of the votes in the election in Hamburg and 6.6% in Bremen30. 
28  Grundsatzrede von Christian Lindner MdL Bundesvorsitzender der FDP auf dem a.o. 
Bundesparteitag in Berlin am 8.12.2013 (bearbeitete Mitschrift), http://www.christi-
an-lindner.de/files/204/Grundsatzrede_ Lindner_BPT_Berlin_07.12.13.pdf (dostęp: 
30.10.2015).
29  Europawahl 2014, http://www.europawahl-bw.de/start_uebersicht.html (dostęp: 
30.10.2015).
30  M. Theile, Die Trümmerfrau, „Die Zeit” 2015, nr 2; M. Widmann, Die Magenta-Of-
fensive, „Die Zeit” 2015, nr 7; Da klingt ein wenig Neid durch, 16.02.2015, http://www.
handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/buergerschaftswahlen-2015/fdp-spitzenfrau-
suding-nach-der-hamburg-wahl-da-klingt-ein-wenig-neid-durch/11379364.html 





Reasons for the defeat Consequences of FDPs dwindling significance
Leadership crisis (lack of charisma, politi-
cal scandals)
Dwindling numbers of representatives
Reunification of Germany (exhaustion of 
the formula in international policy)
Defeat in federal elections, state and Eu-
ropean Parliament elections
Globalisation and the changes in the labo-
ur market and family structure
Increase in significance of other political 
groups
Ineffective election campaigns Liberalism concept crisis
Weak cooperation in coalition Issues with financing activities
Social consequence of change after 1990 
and political party crisis
Loss of areas, where FDP articulated its 
views and governed
Conclusions
There are only a few months left of a very hard work for the liberals before the 
Parliament elections of 2017. Undoubtedly the fact that they are outside the 
Bundestag undermined the party’s prestige. Despite the fact that the FDP’s 
leaders say they learned a lesson from the defeat, it is hard to foresee the elec-
tion result. The German political stage is dominated by new problems and 
challenges. Statements of party’s representatives will be observed and judged 
very closely. It is hard to determine today if the liberals will overcome the 
leadership crisis and maintain the change momentum and optimism per-
sonified by Katja Suding. The liberals should definitely speak their opinion 
on important issues such as the relocation of immigrants in the European 
Union, the problem of liabilities and crisis in the labour market. With euro
-sceptical parties gaining support in the Republic of Germany, the liberals 
will have a hard time winning votes if they only found their campaign on 
mottos of European integration and strengthening the market economy and 
lowering taxes. Careless statements which Guido Westerwelle failed to avoid 
and moral scandals of which Brüderle was accused have undermined the 
party’s image, but they were not the last straw. The adverse economic situ-
ation in Europe and the voters’ interest in new groups on the political stage 
contributed as well. Before the reunification of Germany, despite controver-
sies such as the Naumann scandal or Flick scandal, the liberals managed to 
remain in power.
Despite growing criticism of the German liberals it is worth noting that 
in the past they had many achievements in the internal and international 
FDP’s election defeat in 2013 – reasons and consequences
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politics. It’s possible that the voters will acknowledge the diligence, commit-
ment and enthusiasm and appreciate the newly prepared program by giving 
them another chance in the next election to the Bundestag.
Streszczenie
Celem artykułu jest analiza przyczyn porażki Wolnej Partii Demokratycz-
nej (FDP) w wyborach parlamentarnych w 2013 roku oraz zwrócenie uwa-
gi na skutki obecności FDP poza Bundestagiem. Wśród głównych źródeł 
klęski partii wymieniono: kryzys przywództwa (krytyka za brak charyzmy, 
skandale polityczne); zjednoczenie Niemiec (wyczerpanie formuły w poli-
tyce międzynarodowej i społeczne następstwa zjednoczenia, w tym krytykę 
partii politycznych); globalizację i towarzyszące jej zmiany na rynku pracy 
i w strukturze rodziny; nieskuteczność kampanii wyborczych oraz słabość 
współpracy w koalicji. Do głównych następstw klęski FDP zaliczono: kur-
czenie się liczby członków; porażki w wyborach federalnych, krajowych i do 
Parlamentu Europejskiego; wzrost znaczenia innych ugrupowań politycz-
nych; kryzys koncepcji liberalizmu; problem z finansowaniem działalności; 
utratę aren, na których FDP artykułowała poglądy i sprawowała władzę.
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